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RANGERS, MOUNTIES, AND THE SUBJUGATION 
OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, 1870 .. 1885 
ANDREW R. GRAYBILL 
During the 1840s and 1850s, more than 
300,000 traders and overland emigrants fol-
lowed the Platte and Arkansas rivers west-
ward across the Central Plains, the winter 
habitat of the bison. The rapid environmental 
degradation of this area had the ·effect of driv-
ing the bison to the extreme Northern and 
Southern Plains, where white hidehunters 
slaughtered the animals.! By the mid-1870s 
indigenous peoples at both ends of the grass-
lands, in places such as the Texas Panhandle 
and the upper Missouri River valley, fiercely 
defended the dwindling herds in an attempt 
to avoid starvation. 2 
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The Indians' predicament was not theirs 
alone, however, as Native efforts at self-pres-
ervation posed a significant threat to Euro-
American plans for the frontier. To that end, 
government officials on the peripheries of the 
Great Plains developed a remarkably similar 
strategy: the use of mounted constabularies to 
pacify indigenous peoples. Indeed, the North-
West Mounted Police were created and the 
Texas Rangers renewed and reorganized in the 
early 1870s specifically to address the pressing 
"native question" confronting Texas and west-
ern Canada, among the few places where bi-
son still roamed after 1870. Of course, 
'authorities in Austin and Ottawa relied on 
other armed forces to wrest control of their 
hinterlands away from indigenous peoples-
most notably the US Army and the Canadian 
militia-but no two groups rendered more ef-
fective service in this regard than the Rangers 
and the Mounted Police.3 
Few scholars have situated the efforts of 
these constabularies within the context of the 
rapidly changing conditions for Indians on the 
Great Plains after 1865. Studies of the Rang-
ers tend to regard their post-Civil War anti-
Indian vigilance as merely the continuation 
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of an inevitable conflict between incompat-
ible cultures, while Canadian historians have 
overlooked the more coercive dimensions of 
the Mounties' duties, especially in the 1870s.4 
An examination of the two forces, however, 
reveals that both Austin and Ottawa called 
on their rural police to manage indigenous 
populations facing societal collapse, and that 
the constabularies responded in similar fash-
ion: by controlling or denying the Natives' 
access to the bison. 
Though fought almost entirely to the east of 
Texas, the Civil War was nevertheless costly 
for the state, as it lost some of its leading ante-
bellum political figures. 5 More disturbing, per-
haps, was the recession of the frontier, a 
byproduct of the manpower needs of the Con-
federacy, which had left Texas unable to de-
fend itself from Indian attacks, long a feature 
of Anglo-Native relations in the state. Given 
the instability of the Civil War era in Texas, 
the violence of this period was among the worst 
that the state's population had yet endured, 
with one historian estimating that over 400 
residents were killed, wounded, or taken cap-
tive between 1862 and 1865 alone. 6 
With the end of the war, however, Austin 
turned its attention once again to the nagging 
problem of Native depredations, which, if any-
thing, seemed to be growing worse after 1865. 
In north Texas, settlers complained frequently 
of Kiowa and Comanche raids emanating from 
the Indian Territory just across the Red River.7 
It would be difficult to overstate the anxiety 
caused in Austin by such missives, as state 
officials worried that the violence, if un-
checked, would halt migration to west Texas, 
a concern voiced explicitly by a number of 
whites. s 
Texans were not alone in their dire assess-
ments of the circumstances along the frontier, 
as several federal officials dispatched to the 
region commented on the adverse effects of 
Native violence on white settlers. One such 
observer was Lawrie Tatum, the Indian agent 
at Fort Sill in the Indian Territory. Tatum, 
however, sounded a slightly more optimistic 
note than did Texas residents, noting that the 
Comanche responsible for the raids were "fast 
passing away," and that unless they soon chose 
a more civilized path, "it is not likely they will 
last much beyond the present generation."9 
Tatum's letter is particularly useful in evok-
ing the climate along the state's northern and 
western frontiers, for it suggests that white 
settlers were not the only residents of the 
Southern Plains experiencing great hardships 
following the Civil War. Like many of the 
settlers, though, Tatum seems not to have rec-
ognized the powerful correlative relationship 
between the sufferings of both Anglos and 
Indians at this time. White insecurities 
stemmed directly from the Natives' own di-
lemmas and shaped Austin's strategies to se-
cure the Texas frontier. 
The Comanche who raided in northern 
Texas during the nineteenth century were 
descendants of the group's eastern branch, 
which had migrated to Texas from present-
day Colorado in the mid-eighteenth century. 
The Kotsoteka-or "buffalo eaters"-hunted 
elk, black bear, deer, and antelope, but as their 
name suggests, their principal means of sub-
sistence was the bison. 1O By the early 1800s 
the Kotsoteka were in full control of the bi-
son-hunting grounds below the Canadian 
River, and Comanche bands ranged as far into 
Texas as the Hill Country, located in the cen-
tral part of the state. ll 
Hunting alongside the Comanche were the 
Kiowa, who-despite cultural and linguistic 
differences-had forged an extremely close 
alliance with the Comanche during the late 
eighteenth century. 12 Like the Comanche, the 
Kiowa inhabited the grasslands south of the 
Arkansas River, developing a cultural and eco-
nomic reliance on the region's bison, whose 
numbers-estimated by Dan Flores at approxi-
mately eight million-must have seemed in-
exhaustible to the Indians during the first half 
of the nineteenth century.13 Such was not the 
case, however. 
By the early 1860s a combination of human 
and ecological factors had reduced the number 
of bison. 14 Compounding matters for the Indi-
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FIG. 1. This bison cow and her calves-photographed in the 1890s in Canada's Banff National Park-were 
among the few remaining buffalo on the Great Plains in the late nineteenth century, as the vast majority had been killed 
off by changing ecological conditions and especially human predation. Courtesy of Glenbow Archives, NC-2 7 -11. 
ans was the fact that white settlement and 
expansion into the Central Plains had pushed 
the dwindling herds into Texas, which had 
expelled the Comanche from their reserva-
tion on the Brazos River in 1859. 15 Caught 
between a scarcity of game and the brutal tac-
tics employed by the US Army in defending 
railroads and Euro-American settlers, the 
Kiowa and Comanche-with estimated popu-
lations in the late 1860s of 2,000 and 4,000, 
respectively-met several times with federal 
representatives, hoping to establish peace and 
to chart a course for Native survival. 16 
Treaty negotiations also provided Indian 
leaders a chance to vent their frustrations with 
US policy, as captured in a speech by Eagle 
Drinking, a Comanche chief, at the 1865 pro-
ceedings on the Little Arkansas River. In re-
sponse to Commissioner ]. B. Sanborn's pro-
posal that the Comanche and Kiowa cede lands 
north of the Canadian River and accept settle-
ment on a reservation in the Indian Territory, 
Eagle Drinking replied: "I am fond of the land 
I was born on. The white man has land enough. 
I don't want to divide again."17 Nevertheless, 
in exchange for a supposedly permanent hunt-
ing ground in far northwestern Texas, Eagle 
Drinking, among others, signed the treaty on 
October 18, 1865. 
As the Comanche and Kiowa were to dis-
cover, however, peace negotiations often prom-
ised more than they delivered. For instance, 
while the bands who signed the 1867 Treaty 
of Medicine Lodge Creek believed that the 
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agreement had guaranteed them exclusive ac-
cess to the hunting grounds below the Arkan-
sas River, the treaty never expressly forbade 
Euro-Americans from entering the area. Thus, 
the white hidehunters who poured into the 
Texas Panhandle after 1870 drove to the brink 
of extinction the very herds of bison on which 
the Indians had pinned their own hopes of 
self-preservarion. 18 
Frustrated by the disappearance of the bi-
son and exasperated by the perceived duplic-
ity of federal officials, as many as two-thirds of 
the Kiowa and Comanche-including those 
who had previously accepted treaty obliga-
tions-ventured into Texas during the late 
1860s. While their primary objecti ves no doubt 
were bison and the horses needed to hunt them, 
many Indians also increased their attacks on 
white settlements with the intent of driving 
off those who would endanger their access to 
the diminishing herds. 
These were the bands of raiders so bitterly 
described by Euro-Americans along the Texas 
frontier in the late 1860s and early 1870s. 
Seeking a definitive end to the conflict and 
the promotion of further Anglo migration, the 
Texas legislature passed a bill in June 1870 
authorizing the institution of a "Frontier 
Force." This act had the effect of reestablish-
ing the Texas Rangers, who had lapsed into 
irrelevance during the Civil War and Recon-
struction and were replaced with the state 
police by a skeptical Republican administra-
tion. 19 Four years later, this detachment of 
Rangers was reorganized into the six compa-
nies of the Frontier Battalion and charged with 
containing "marauding or thieving parties" of 
Indians. 20 Their mission was relatively straight-
forward: to drive Native Americans from 
within the borders of the state beyond the 
reach of the resources on which their survival 
depended. 
Considering that after the Civil War the 
United States had committed significant mili-
tary resources to Texas for the purposes of fron-
tier defense-including one artillery, three 
cavalry, and four infantry regiments-one is 
tempted to ask why state administrators felt it 
necessary to resuscitate the Rangers. 21 There 
are two answers. In the first place, the Rangers 
were revered within Texas as Indian fighters 
par excellence, a reputation that dated back 
to the brutal campaigns led by Capt. John 
Coffee Hays against the Comanche in the 
18408.22 Faced now with a level of Indian vio-
lence not seen since those days, Texans looked 
to the Rangers once more to deliver them from 
"the many tribes of savages" along the fron-
tier, a job for which they seemed uniquely 
qualified. 23 
Archival records suggest that the Rangers 
were indeed well suited to the task of Indian 
conquest. For one thing, the overwhelming 
majority of the men who served in the Rang-
ers had come to the force from rural parts of 
Texas, the Plains states, and the South, and as 
such very likely had experience with Native 
Americans, something the Rangers themselves 
considered of inestimable value. 24 As one cap-
tain who fought in west Texas noted: "The US 
Troops don't understand the character of these 
Indians, nor are they acquainted with the char-
acter of the country. My men are all frontiers-
men, thoroughly acquainted with the whole 
country and well versed in [their] machina-
tions and tactics."25 
But beyond their storied history and famed 
expertise, the Rangers were called upon by 
Austin and celebrated by the citizenry because 
they were enthusiastic in executing the state's 
Indian policy. For instance, although there 
were approximately 4,500 federal troops serv-
ing in Texas at any given time after the Civil 
War, the 450 Rangers of the Frontier Battalion 
engaged Indians in battle on more than one-
third as many occasions as their army counter-
parts between 1865 and 188I.26 Moreover, 
though possessing only one-tenth of the army's 
manpower in the state, the Rangers killed half 
as many Indians as the federal troops did over 
the same period (82 to 163, respectively) and 
managed to wound two more (26 to 24).17 
As important as the reputation of the Rang-
ers was to their reestablishment in the 1870s, 
perhaps more significant was the fact that pub-
lic officials and private citizens alike had little 
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faith in the US Army detachments sent to 
protect them from Kiowa and Comanche raid-
ers.28 For one thing, Texans were convinced 
that the military presence was simply too small 
and scattered to make much difference in the 
event of an Indian attack. The most frequently 
repeated complaint regarded the distance be-
tween army posts, which afforded huge gaps 
through which Indians could enter the state. 29 
Part of the problem, in the eyes of Texas ob-
servers, was that authorities in Washington 
DC habitually underestimated the Indian dan-
gers along the state's frontiers. To be sure, 
federal officials did have their doubts about 
the dire conditions reported in Texas, as ex-
emplified by an 1871 visit from Gen. William 
T. Sherman to Fort Richardson, which he made 
with the express purpose of debunking the 
Texans' anxieties. Sherman believed the hys-
teria little more than a ruse intended to draw 
federal troops away from Reconstruction duty, 
although he changed his mind after narrowly 
escaping a mixed party of Kiowa and Coman-
che raiders near the Salt Creek Prairie. 30 
Perhaps more vexing than the army's ap-
parent inability to defend them, however, was 
the sense among many Texans that the federal 
government was simply not committed to a 
policy of total Indian removal from the state. 
For their part, Austin officials in the post-
Civil War period had clearly determined that 
Anglos and Indians could not coexist within 
the boundaries of Texas, as evidenced by the 
collapse of the state's two reservations within 
five years of their 1854 establishment, and the 
exile of all remaining Natives to the Indian 
Territory.3! Washington, on the other hand, 
had settled on President U. S. Grant's so-called 
"peace policy," a less confrontational plan that 
sought diplomatic solutions to Anglo-Native 
conflicts, like the 1867 Treaty of Medicine 
Lodge Creek that allowed Indians the right to 
hunt buffalo in the Panhandle. 
This federal moderation, Texans believed, 
had infected the military detachments stationed 
in the Southern Plains. Though capable of strik-
ing with indiscriminate ferocity-as seen at 
the Washita River, Summit Springs, and the 
Marais River-the army seemed just as likely 
to display a peculiar quality of restraint. For 
instance, soldiers in Texas rarely followed up 
their smaller victories with decisive engage-
ments, belying the genocidal bent often as-
cribed to them by modern historians. 32 Limited 
perhaps by the tenets of the peace policy or 
preferring instead to wage a war of attrition, 
the US Army did not attempt the complete 
removal of Indians from the state during the 
1870s, and on occasion even allowed Natives 
to remain within its borders after the Natives' 
defeat in the Red River War of 1874-75.33 
Such decisions drove Texans to distraction, 
like the citizens of Donley County, who in 
1878 complained to Austin that "the few 
United States troops stationed in the Pan 
Handle are totally inadequate to cope with 
the present danger." Instead of asking for more 
US soldiers to come to their relief, however, 
the people of Clarendon begged for a Ranger 
squad to "aid us in our present distress."34 With 
the failure of the Red River War to end the 
Indian presence in Texas, state officials heeded 
these requests, relying increasingly on the state 
police to accomplish what Washington could 
not-or would not-do. 
As most of the defeated Natives had re-
turned to their agencies in the Indian T erri-
tory by the summer of 1875, federal officials in 
the region declared that peace (if perhaps an 
uneasy one) reigned in the area. As an indica-
tion of Washington's confidence that conflict 
on the Southern Plains was over, the army 
reduced its troop strength in Texas, diverting 
extra forces to the Northern Plains, where the 
United States faced stiff opposition from 
groups of Sioux, Cheyenne, and Blackfoot 
Indians resisting the same white encroachment 
that had triggered the Red River conflict. 
Texans, however, were not nearly so san-
guine about conditions along their northern 
and western frontiers, as Indians still crossed 
into the state periodically in search of game to 
augment their meager rations. For instance, 
Judge Emanuel Deibbs of Wheeler County in 
the Panhandle wrote to Austin in June 1879 
that "a band of Pawnees came through this 
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Co. creating a great deal of excitement, and 
almost resulting in a serious difficulty with 
them."35 Although the Indians returned to 
their reservation without incident, the mes-
sage was clear: the problem of Indians in north 
Texas was by no means resolved, despite the 
end of the Red River War.36 
The Rangers would certainly have agreed 
with this sentiment. Adj. Gen. William Steele 
commented that perhaps the only perceptible 
difference between the periods before and af-
ter the Red River War was that "during the 
past year [1875], the Indian raids have been by 
small parties, who depended upon their adroit-
ness in concealment, rather than in their 
strength, for safety."37 Overall for the period 
between August 1875 and December 1877, 
Steele reported that fifty-seven Indian parties 
had entered the state, killing forty citizens and 
making off with nearly 900 horses and mules.38 
Where had all the Natives come from? won-
dered Texans from Austin to the small towns 
scattered along the growing frontier. 
As it turned out; many of the Kiowa and 
Comanche bands chased by the Rangers had 
passed into the state with the consent of sol-
diers stationed both in Texas and the Indian 
Territory. Complaining to military officials of 
starvation on their agencies, Indian chiefs 
sought permission for hunting parties to cross 
the Red River, which by that time was the last 
refuge of the bison on the Southern Plains. 
The soldiers, motivated in part by expedi-
ency-reducing starvation could alleviate the 
tensions posed by confinement on the reser-
vations-but also by compassion, often com-
plied with these requests. 
Such was the case with Lt. A. M. Patch, 
who described his encounter with a band of 
Indians near Fort Elliott in 1879. As Patch 
explained, the group's leader "complained bit-
terly of his Agency, saying that his people did 
not get enough to eat there, and that he did 
not want to go back until he found buffalo 
[and that] he did not intend any mischief." 
Impressed with their good disposition, Patch 
released the Indians on the condition that if 
the Indian sent back to the reservation by the 
chief for a valid hunting pass did not return, 
the group would immediately depart the state.39 
Texans, predictably, complained vocifer-
ously about this practice, believing that the 
incursions of the Native hunting parties were 
merely the prelude to another major conflict 
in the region. As one citizen in Brown County 
explained to Gov. O. M. Roberts in February 
1879, "[T]here was now on Texas soil over 
one thousand 'Indians,' pretending that their 
mission was 'hunting,'" adding that there was 
"great danger of an outbreak, in the Spring, on 
our frontier."4o Such threats presented dire 
implications for the nascent stock-raising in-
dustry of west Texas, which residents hoped 
would bind the area to more developed parts 
of the state. 
For their part, military officials defended 
their actions, insisting that settlers greatly 
exaggerated both the size and frequency of 
such Indian forays while flatly dismissing 
Anglo claims of alleged "outrages" committed 
by the Natives.4' Although some command-
ing officers attempted to ameliorate the situa-
tion by promising to send military escorts along 
with Indian hunting parties, others explained 
that troop reductions made this practice largely 
infeasible.42 Bvt. Maj. Gen. John Pope, com-
mander of the Department of the Missouri and 
a noted advocate of fair treatment for the In-
dians, evinced less patience for the Texans' 
complaints, explaining that "insufficient sub-
sistence" by the government made bison hunts 
"absolutely necessary."43 
Abandoned by the federal government, 
Austin turned to the Rangers for help in set-
tling the state's Indian question once and for 
all. The police did not disappoint, resolving, 
it seems, to pursue with ferocity every Native 
band trespassing in the state. Such grim deter-
mination emerges in an 1878 letter from Lt. 
G. W. Arrington, who wrote to Adj. Gen. 
John B. Jones, Steele's successor as adjutant 
general, that he had heard rumors of several 
Indian bands camped just across the state line 
in Wilbarger County. Volunteering to inter-
cept them, Arrington added that he was "sat-
isfied we can bring back scalps with US."44 
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More significantly, the Rangers aimed to 
cut off the Fort Sill Indians from any access to 
the state's remaining bison, believing that this 
tactic would deter N ati ves from entering Texas 
and would cause the federal government to 
seal the borders. Jones went so far as to claim 
in an 1879 letter that there were no bison or 
game of any kind in northwest Texas-surely 
an exaggeration-in the hopes that Pope and 
his men might put a stop to the crossings.45 
When this failed to solve the problem, the 
Rangers adopted more radical measures, which 
brought them into direct conflict with Wash-
ington and the military establishment. 
Tensions ran highest in the Panhandle, 
where a small number of whites had estab-
lished profitable stock-raising operations that 
they believed were endangered by the contin-
ued Indian presence. Seeking to protect these 
ventures by driving off Natives in search of 
bison, Ranger detachments squared off against 
military officials in the region. One such en-
counter took place inJ une 1879, when Arrington 
traveled to Wheeler County-on the border 
between Texas and the Indian Territory-to 
investigate the complaints of local ranchers. 
Arriving in the town of Sweetwater, 
Arrington was accosted by Gen. John W. 
Davidson, who accused the Rangers of fool-
ishly trying to bring on "a merciless and use-
less war." When asked by the general if he 
would kill any Natives he encountered, 
Arrington replied that he "most assuredly 
would if they were armed." Vowing to protect 
the Indians of the Panhandle, Davidson said 
he would not allow "an armed mob to be trav-
elling through the country," and ordered his 
men to fire upon the Rangers if they disturbed 
any Natives. 46 
Perhaps the most explosive encounter be-
tween Rangers and soldiers of the US Army 
took place earlier that year. Moved by the 
desperate conditions facing a band of Kiowa 
and Comanche who had left Fort Sill in search 
of food, Nicholas Nolan, a captain in the Tenth 
Cavalry, arranged for the group to cross into 
Texas with a military escort.47 A squad of Rang-
ers patrolling along the Red River discovered 
FIG. 2. As commander of the Frontier Battalion 
and later as Adjutant General of the State of Texas, 
John B. Jones directed many of the Ranger efforts to 
remove Native Americans who crossed into the state 
during the 1870s. He died in 1881 at age 47. Courtesy 
of the Texas State Library and Archives Commission. 
the party, and "without any provocation" at-
tacked the Indians-killing Sunboy, a Kiowa 
chief-despite the clear presence of the ac-
companying ten-man military detachment, an 
action that set off a bitter quarrel between 
Nolan and the Ranger commander.48 
While these efforts were no doubt success-
ful in driving the Indians from Texas, the Rang-
ers received substantial help from both houses 
of the U.S. Congress. Troubled by the con-
tinuing violence in Texas, and persuaded, per-
haps, by the impassioned appeals of the state's 
representatives in Washington, Congress ap-
proved a bill in the spring of 1880 that ex-
pressly prevented reservation Indians from 
entering any part of Texas. Most telling was 
the sentence that concluded section 1 of the 
act, which read, in part, that "any officer or 
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agent of the Army or Indian Bureau who shall 
violate this law shall be dismissed from the 
public service."49 
Native Americans did not disappear en-
tirely from the state after 1880, although the 
greatly reduced demand for Ranger anti-In-
dian duty suggests how complete their removal 
efforts-with an assist from Congress-had 
been. The near-total disappearance of the bi-
son and the continued vigilance of the Rang-
ers had made Texas virtually uninhabitable 
for Indians by the dawn of the 1880s, as Adj. 
Gen. W. H. King noted in his annual report 
for 1882: "Practically, there is very little use 
for any Rangers so far as danger from Indian 
raids is concerned," a notion that would have 
been unthinkable even two years before. 50 
To be sure, there were sporadic reports of 
Indian sightings by rail crews in west Texas 
around this time, but when investigated by 
the Rangers-who would stop by the camps 
for a day or two-such scouts usually turned 
up very little.51 Ironically, it was this much 
less violent Ranger assignment (the supervi-
sion of rail camps~ that delivered the final 
blow to Native resistance in Texas. By keep-
ing a close watch on track and grading crews 
in the trans-Pecos region, the Rangers facili-
tated the extension of the all-important iron 
roads, which brought with them, into even 
the farthest reaches of the state, the white 
settlers of Austin's aspirations. 
At the other end of the Great Plains, Cana-
dian officials in the early 1870s did not face 
the same troubling reality of Indian-white 
conflict that their Austin counterparts did, 
largely because of sparse Euro·Canadian settle-
ment north of the forty-ninth paralle1.52 Nev-
ertheless, Ottawa's fears of such violence were 
hardly less intense, for the augu·st goals of the 
new National Policy-especially the construc-
tion of a transcontinental railroad and the 
promotion of Euro-Canadian migration-
would languish if confronted by systematic 
Indian resistance. 53 Before 'settlers could es-
tablish homesteads and entrepreneurial ven-
tures on the prairies, Ottawa needed assurance 
that white migrants would suffer no harm at 
the hands of potentially defensive Natives. 
These official concerns were not unfounded, 
as suggested by reports arriving in the capital 
from Canadians already on the Plains. Al-
though the federal government had laid the 
groundwork for peaceful westward expansion 
by negotiating treaties in 1871 with bands of 
OJ ibwa and Swampy Cree Indians in southern 
Manitoba, Ottawa had made few inroads 
among the Native groups farther west who 
inhabited the territory between Lake Winnipeg 
and the Rocky Mountains. These Indians, par-
ticularly the Cree and Blackfoot peoples, 
deeply resented the growing Euro-Canadian 
presence in their midst, and insisted that set-
tlers and surveyors first obtain Native permis-
sion before venturing onto their lands. 
The Cree Indians, so vehemently opposed 
to Canadian expansion, occupied the south-
eastern Plains of the Dominion's frontier, an 
area on either side of the border separating 
the present-day provinces of Alberta and 
Saskatchewan. Their ancestors had migrated 
to this territory from the Great Lakes, and 
once on the Plains the woodland Cree acquired 
horses and gradually abandoned trapping in 
favor of hunting buffalo, which had become 
the central element of Cree existence by the 
early 1800s. With an 1860 peJpulation of ap-
proximately 12,000, the Cree were the largest 
single indigenous group on' the Canadian 
Plains, and they controlled the fertile hunting 
grounds along the Battle and North Saskatch-
ewan rivers,54 
The principal rivals of the Cree for both 
horses and access to the bison were the esti-
mated 10,000 Indians comprising the three 
groups of the Blackfoot Confederacy: the 
Blood, Peigan, and Blackfoot proper. 55 De-
scribed by one historian as "the strongest and 
most aggressive nation on the Canadian prai-
ries" after the mid-eighteenth century, the 
Blackfoot cl~itp.ed the area to the southwest of 
the Cree hunting grounds, a region that 
straddled the international boundary between 
the Dominion and the United States.56 Given 
the expansionist ambitions of the Blackfoot 
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Confederacy, hostilities with the powerful and 
proximate Cree were a regular feature of 
Blackfoot life until 1870, when the groups 
treated for peaceY 
By that time, both the Blackfoot and the 
Cree faced greater problems than the horse-
raiding expeditions launched by one people 
against the other. In the first place, in 1869 
the Hudson's Bay Company had sold the vast 
North- West Territories to the recently 
founded Dominion of Canada, leaving the sta-
tus of the region's Indians in doubt. 58 More 
distressing to the Natives, however, was the 
rapid decline in the area's bison population, 
accelerated-as in the south-by white 
hidehunters. Already pressured by the Indians 
themselves, as well as the Metis-the mixed-
blood descendants of European trappers and 
Indian women-the once great herds had been 
pushed to the far western edge of the North-
ern Plains by the early 1870s.59 
Keenly aware of the threat to their exist-
ence posed by the land transfer and the disap-
pearance of the bison, the Cree and Blackfoot 
looked upon white newcomers with great skep-
ticism. As one Hudson's Bay Company trader 
explained to the lieutenant governor of the 
North-West Territories in 1871, a deputation 
of Cree chiefs had come to see him at 
Edmonton, where they sought "to ascertain 
whether their lands had been sold or not, and 
what was the intention of the Canadian Gov-
ernment in relation to them." The trader en-
closed a message from Sweet Grass, a Cree 
chief, that began inpart, "We heard our lands 
were sold and we did not like it; we don't want 
to sell our lands; it is our property, and no one 
has a right to sell them."60 
The Blackfoot were no less concerned by 
the growing white encroachment. As ex-
plained by Constantine Scollen, an Oblate 
priest traveling among the Indians in the mid-
1870s, "The Blackfeet are extremely jealous 
of what they consider their country, and never 
allowed any white men, Half-breeds [Metis]' 
or Crees to remain in it for any length of time." 
Compounding Blackfoot anxieties, Scollen 
explained, was the advent of the North-West 
Mounted Police among the Natives, as the 
Indians believed that the police had come not 
only to establish law and order, "but also to 
protect white people against them, and that 
this country will be gradually taken from them 
without any ceremony."61 
Fueled by these anxieties, the Cree and 
Blackfoot sought to preserve their nomadic 
existence by challenging the outsiders who 
arrived in their territory without Native con-
sent and who killed or scared off the dwin-
dling game on which Indian survival depended. 
Ottawa, on the other hand, was no less re-
solved to promote its own agenda for the area, 
and turned now to the North-West Mounted 
Police for help in resolving the impasse. Un-
like the Rangers, however, the Mounties' mis-
sion-as described by Deputy Prime Minister 
Hewitt Bernard-was essentially a nonviolent 
one: "[Tlo give confidence to peaceable Indi-
ans and intending settlers."62 This the police 
would accomplish through negotiation. 
Before considering the role of the North-
West Mounted Police in facilitating treaties 
between Ottawa and the Plains Indians, it is 
worth asking why the federal government 
chose this approach to begin with, instead of 
adopting more confrontational methods. One 
factor, at least in western Canada, was the 
long history of Hudson's Bay Company con-
trol there. Company traders had cooperated 
with and supported many Indian groups, which 
had served no doubt to foster some degree of 
trust between Natives and whites. Ottawa 
hoped to capitalize on these relationships as it 
extended its power into the prairies. As im-
portant was the Canadian government's dedi-
cation to the treaty-making process, which as 
historian Jill St. Germain explains, had sur-
vived largely intact since the days of the Proc-
lamation of 1763.63 
Practical considerations dictated a peace-
ful plan of action as well. Even had the Cana-
dian government chosen to conduct an 
aggressive campaign against the Blackfoot and 
Cree, there was a more immediate obstacle 
than the Dominion's diplomatic obligations: 
Ottawa simply did not have the money needed 
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to implement such a strategy. For instance, 
during the 1870s the United States spent 
nearly $20 million each year on its Indian wars, 
but Canada's entire budget for the same pe-
riod was only $19 million.64 
The Mounties were an obvious choice to 
initiate the treaty process, as they were the 
Dominion's principal representatives in the 
area and had been sent west by Ottawa ex-
pressly to make contact with Native groups 
and to obviate any possible conflicts between 
Indians and whites. 65 Charged now by the gov-
ernment with laying the groundwork neces-
sary for treaty negotiations between Canada 
and the Plains Indians, the Mounted Police 
sought to establish diplomatic relations with 
the Blackfoot and the Cree, and to win the 
confidence of the Indians' most influential 
chiefs. To that end, the police distributed gifts 
of blankets, tobacco, tea, and ammunition.66 
By all accounts, the Mounties' initial ef-
forts were a great success. Describing a meet-
ing between the Mounties and a group of 
Blackfoot Indians, Father Scollen exclaimed, 
"All honor I say to the 'Mounted Police,' who 
have been able to inspire with such confidence 
these poor members of humanity." For their 
part, according to Scollen, the Indians had 
graciously received the hospitality of their 
"new white friends, and the assurances of more 
peaceful days in future."67 
Despite the progress in Canadian-Indian 
relations facilitated by the Mounted Police 
and the fact that the Cree and Blackfoot had 
for several years petitioned Ottawa to meet 
with them, many chiefs assumed a diffident 
posture when treaty commissioners actually 
arrived in the West in 1876 and 1877. As 
Alexander Morris, lieutenant governor of the 
North-West Territories, explained after re-
ceiving several Cree delegations at Fort 
Carlton, "[T]hey dreaded the treaty; they had 
been made to believe that they would be com-
pelled to live on the reserves wholly, and aban-
don their hunting."68 
Although Morris assured the Indians that 
"we [do] not want to take that means ofliving 
from you," he went on to sketch a scenario 
that would indeed circumscribe, if not elimi-
nate, Cree access to the bison, saying that "if 
a man, whether Indian or Half-breed, had a 
good field of grain, you would not destroy it 
with your hunt."69 Even more unambiguous 
indications of the government's designs for 
the Plains Indians appeared in the boilerplate 
of the "numbered treaties," the accords by 
which Canada obtained title to every acre of 
the prairies. The wording of the agreements 
granted the Indians the right to roam over the 
lands they had ceded "excepting such portions 
of the territory as pass from the Crown into 
the occupation of individuals or otherwise."70 
Maintaining access to the hunting grounds, 
however, was of little consequence to the In-
dians if there were no bison on the prairies to 
hunt. While many Cree and Blackfoot chiefs 
revealed their willingness to try farming if the 
bison disappeared, Native leaders made it clear 
to the treaty commissioners that they preferred 
a nomadic existence for as long as possible 
and urged the government to preserve the bi-
son. By the time the governing council of the 
North-West Territories took up the matter in 
1877-implementing measures aimed at lim-
iting Indian but not necessarily white preda-
tion-the herds had dwindled so significantly 
that the measure was quickly repealed the fol-
lowing year. 71 
In the end, the bison's near-extinction and 
the seeming inevitability of white settlement 
led many Cree and Blackfoot chiefs to sign 
Treaties Number Six and Seven in 1876 and 
1877, respectively, despite their misgivings. 
In addition to the presents the commissioners 
gave them, the Indians were convinced to "sell" 
their lands to the government by guarantees 
of annuity payments in perpetuity, the supply 
of farm implements and requisite agricultural 
instruction, as well as promises of education 
for Native children. In this way, Ottawa's plans 
for inducing Natives to move onto reserves 
closely mirrored similar efforts by US officials. 72 
Also of critical importance in encouraging the 
Indians to sign, it seems, was the role of the 
North-West Mounted Police, which had sent 
detachments to all of the treaty proceedings. 
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Straight-backed and clad in scarlet tunics, their 
presence lent prestige and a certain measure 
of royal authority to the ceremonies, although 
their influence probably derived more from 
their own gift offerings and their vigilance in 
containing unsavory American traders. As 
Crowfoot, leader of the Blackfoot nation, said 
during the negotiations for Treaty Number 
Seven: "If the Police had not come to the 
country, where would we be all now? Bad men 
and whiskey were killing us so fast that very 
few, indeed, of us would have been left to-day. 
The Police have protected us as the feathers of 
the bird protect it from the frosts of winter. I 
am satisfied. I will sign the treaty."73 
Although the completion of the Blackfoot 
Treaty in October 1877 had, in effect, severed 
the Indians' last remaining link to the Plains, 
simply extinguishing Native title in the West 
had by no means solved Canada's Indian "prob-
lem." After all, Ottawa had promised, albeit 
with qualifications, not to impede Native ac-
cess to bison hunting grounds, and the treaties 
made Indian occupation of their allotted re-
serves strictly voluntary. The drawbacks of 
such an arrangement-that is, one in which 
the Plains Indians were free to continue a no-
madic existence-soon emerged. 
Government observers, while recognizing 
the Indians' determination to continue hunt-
ing bison, knew also that the herds were on 
the brink of extinction, and they worried about 
managing Canada's indigenous populations 
once the buffalo were gone. Considering that 
the extension of the Canadian Pacific Rail-
way was imminent, and that with its construc-
tion would come thousands of workers and 
settlers, the government believed it impera-
tive to eliminate any threat posed by nomadic 
Indians to the white newcomers by removing 
the Natives from the prairies. Once again, 
Ottawa turned to the Mounties, who sought 
to end the dependence of the Plains Indians 
on the bison. 
A critical if seemingly indirect step in this 
direction was the Mounties' attempts to elimi-
nate the liquor trade in the North-West Ter-
ritories, which experienced explosive growth 
FIG. 3. In 1877, as the head chief of the Blackfoot, 
Crowfoot helped negotiate Treaty No.7, an agreement 
that ceded the southern portion of present-day Alberta 
to the new Canadian nation. In his remarks, Crowfoot 
noted that the benevolent presence of the Mounted 
Police had invested him with the confidence necessary 
to sign the accord. Courtesy of the Glenbow Archives, 
NC-29-1. 
after the Hudson's Bay Company ceded its 
lands to Canada in 1869. With no legal in-
junctions against the sale of alcohol in the 
N orth-West Territories, white traders prohib-
ited from selling liquor in Montana poured 
across the international boundary and estab-
lished forts with colorful names such as 
"Whoop-Up," "Slide-Out," and "Standoff."74 
At the posts, Euro-Americans did a booming 
business in buffalo robes, even after the great 
herds had started their precipitous decline. 75 
Indians supplied many of these hides in ex-
change for liquor, which introduced great so-
cial disorganization in Native communities. 76 
Natives intoxicated by vast quantities of 
whiskey-often spiced with tobacco, molas-
ses, pepper, and ginger to heighten its effects-
died in horrific numbers, with one missionary 
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estimating that forty-two otherwise healthy 
Blackfoot men had perished in drunken brawls 
or by freezing to death in the winter of 1873-
74 alone. Still, the Indians came regularly to 
trade hides for liquor. 77 
Concerned by the turbulence in the North-
West occasioned by alcohol, with the Cypress 
Hills Massacre in 1873 only the most notori-
ous example, Ottawa armed the North-West 
Mounted Police with a mandate to crush the 
region's liquor traffic, which the Mounties 
sought to do upon their arrival in the West. 78 
Police vigilance, however, had a more practi-
cal side to go along with its ostensibly hu-
manitarian objectives. As the minister of 
justice explained in an 1874 letter to his coun-
terpart at the ministry of the interior, the li-
quor trade "has had the effect of demoralizing 
the Indians and retarding all efforts toward 
civilizing and quieting them," so that "little 
can be done towards inducing settlers to go 
into that valuable section of the country."79 
Given Ottawa's plans for "civilizing and 
quieting" the Natives-which involved the 
Indians taking up homesteads and learning 
how to farm-officials saw that stopping the 
liquor trade could go a long way toward wean-
ing Indians off of the bison and thus ending 
Native nomadism, as alcohol was a conse-
quence of and continued inducement to the 
robe trade. so Morris, in fact, made federal in-
tentions and the importance of the Mounted 
Police in implementing those plans explicitly 
clear to the Cree in 1876, during the delibera-
tions at Fort Pitt that preceded the signing of 
Treaty Number Six.8! 
The Mounted Police worked tirelessly to 
extinguish the sale and consumption of alco-
hol in the North-West Territories throughout 
the 1870s. Statistics from the latter part of the 
decade, when such record-keeping by the 
Mounties began, indicate that liquor-related 
offenses constituted a significant percentage 
of total police arrests and prosecutions: 13 
percent in 1878, 24 percent in 1879, 23 per-
cent in 1880, and 14 percent in 1881.82 The 
majority of these cases concerned the impor-
tation of liquor or its sale to Indians, although 
the police also went after the Indians them-
selves. 83 
No less important to Ottawa in ending In-
dian nomadism were the Mounties' efforts to 
eliminate horse theft by Indians, especially 
raids on Native camps lying across the border 
in the United States. For bison-hunting 
peoples like the Cree and Blackfoot, horses 
were indispensable, as they greatly facilitated 
the hunting of bison while allowing Native 
bands to transport their families and belong-
ings across vast distances in the Plains. 84 But 
beyond these economic motives, horses also 
served a social purpose as well. The size of a 
Native man's horse herd, as well as the quality 
of his mounts, were critical factors in deter-
mining a warrior's status in the community.85 
In order to build and maintain their herds, 
small bands of Cree and Blackfoot warriors 
regularly attacked the camps of rival Native 
groups. Although they certainly stole from 
each other, the Cree and Blackfoot often tar-
geted herds controlled by groups to the south, 
in contiguous parts of the United States. The 
Cree, for instance, frequently poached from 
Mandan and Hidatsa camps located in the 
Dakota Territory, while the Blackfoot cov-
eted steeds belonging to the Crow and Flat-
head, Montana groups who lived to their 
southeast and southwest, respectively.86 As 
with the horses themselves, these raids served 
social as well as economic purposes, for suc-
cess in warfare lent prestige to young men seek-
ing advancement in their communities. 
Mounted Police reports from the late 1870s 
and early 1880s confirm the central impor-
tance of horse theft to the Indians of the N orth-
em Plains, and the growing international 
dimensions of the raids during this time pe-
riod. Most vexing to the Mounted Police was 
the fact that Canadian Indians considered ar-
eas north of the international boundary as 
something of a safe haven, referring to the 
forty-ninth parallel as the "medicine line," and 
believing that they were immune from punish-
ment once they had crossed it. Ottawa worried 
that such incidents might be unproductive of 
cordial diplomatic relations with Washington.87 
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However, considering that in the over-
whelming majority of such cases Indians stole 
from other Indians, and with little attendant 
violence, one is led to ask why the Mounted 
Police worked so hard to eradicate the prob-
lem. The answer, it seems, hinges on the rec-
ognition by Canadian officials that, as with 
the liquor trade, putting a stop to Native horse 
theft would severely impair the Indians' abil-
ity to maintain a nomadic existence. 88 It stood 
to reason that a dearth of horses would clearly 
complicate the bison hunt, while simulta-
neously removing both a means of and further 
enticement to Native mobility. Moreover, 
denying Indian access to horses obviated their 
need to cross the international boundary, serv-
ing to further circumscribe the Indians' no-
madic behavior. 
Ironically, despite the best efforts of the 
Mounties in crushing the liquor trade and cur-
tailing Native horse theft, the provision-
rather than the denial-of access to the buffalo 
spelled the end of Native nomadism in the 
Canadian Plains. Following their arrival in the 
West, the Mounties used their influence, as 
well as the power of federal law, to prevent 
conflicts between Native groups. While this 
certainly had its positive effects for Cree and 
Blackfoot communities, it also precluded them 
from defending their hunting grounds from 
outsiders such as whites and Metis, a fact noted 
with some concern by the Blackfoot in delib-
erations for Treaty Seven.89 
Whether this was a calculated strategy in-
tended to deprive the Indians of their life 
source-akin to the policy of noninterference 
adopted by the United States in the 1870s-is 
unclear; police sympathy for the Indians' plight 
seems to suggest that it was not.90 What is 
certain, however, is that this "tragedy of the 
loss of the commons," in combination with 
the Mounties' more deliberate attempts to 
control Cree and Blackfoot access to the bi-
son, accelerated the economic collapse of 
Plains Indian societies in the Canadian West.91 
With few or no bison north of the interna-
tional boundary after 1881, and rapidly shrink-
ing numbers in the Montana river valleys 
below-where the Indians were forbidden from 
hunting, anyway-the Cree and Blackfoot re-
treated to their reservations and the prairies 
fell finally and firmly into Ottawa's posses-
sion.9Z 
Although there were episodes of Native un-
rest in Texas and western Canada after the 
early 1880s-most notably, Canada's North-
West Rebellion of 1885, although this was 
more an affair of the Metis than either the 
Cree or Blackfoot-by that time white settle-
ment and industrial development proceeded 
apace at either end of the Great Plains. Ob-
servers in both capitals attributed this state of 
affairs to their rural police, crediting them-
in remarkably similar language-as having 
served as the "vanguard of civilization."93 
There were, however, real and significant 
differences between the forces with regard to 
their policing of indigenous peoples, the most 
obvious of which turns on the Rangers' liberal 
use of violence by comparison to Mountie re-
straint. Several factors may help to explain 
this. In the first place, the Mounties arrived 
on the prairies in 1874, charged with creating 
optimum conditions for white newcomers, well 
in advance of their arrival. Moreover, as ex-
plained by historian Roger Nichols in his com-
parative study of Indians in the United States 
and Canada, the power of the North-West 
Mounted Police to manage both military and 
civil affairs may have simplified Ottawa's In-
dian policy in the West.94 
In Texas, by contrast, the Rangers inher-
ited a tradition of police service based on the 
armed protection of a continually expanding 
frontier, one long marked by bloody encoun-
ters between Anglo-Texans and Native 
peoples. Rather than entering portions of north 
and west Texas in order to lay the physical, 
legal, and diplomatic groundwork necessary 
for Euro-American occupation as the Mounties 
had done, the Rangers traveled to flashpoints 
of conflict along an already settled frontier, 
seeking to defend territory that Anglos had 
tried to conquer. For Nichols, it is this differ-
ence in settlement patterns between the US 
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and Canadian Wests that explains-more than 
any other factor-the higher levels of violence 
in the United States, and not "any superior 
policy or more careful handling of Indian-re-
lated issues by Canadian officials."95 
Perhaps the central feature in explaining 
Ranger brutality and Mountie nonviolence 
hinges on the fact that one was a state force 
and the other a federal one. The Republic of 
Texas gained admission to the United States 
in full possession of its lands, and after the 
failure of its Indian reservations in the 1850s 
was free to handle its Native peoples as Aus-
tin saw fit. This entailed driving Kiowa and 
Comanche into adjacent states and territo-
ries, where the Indians then became a prob-
lem for Washington to solve. 
The Mounted Police, by contrast-as agents 
of a federal government committed to larger, 
national goals and one keenly aware of the 
newfound global scrutiny that came with na-
tionhood-did not have such an aggressive 
option at their disposal. Moreover, they were 
bound by Ottawa's diplomatic and financial 
constraints in their handling of Canada's in-
digenous peoples. The Mounties could not sim-
ply drive the Cree and Blackfoot across the 
international boundary into Montana, nor 
could they wage a costly and inevitably con-
troversial war against them. 
These divergences should not obscure the 
powerful similarities linking the efforts of the 
two constabularies throughout this period. The 
central mandate governing both the Rangers 
and the Mounties during the late 1870s and 
early 1880s was identical: to prevent Native 
populations from interfering with white mi-
gration and the establishment of Euro-Ameri-
can military and political authority at their 
respective ends of the Great Plains. In each 
case, the police focused their efforts on deny-
ing Indian access to the bison. The Rangers 
accomplished this by closing the borders of 
Texas to Indian outsiders and by attempting 
to exterminate those Natives who managed to 
cross into the state to hunt bison. The 
Mounties employed more indirect and less vi-
cious strategies-attacking the liquor trade, 
curtailing horse theft, and preventing inter-
tribal warfare-which destabilized Native re-
liance on the buffalo. 
These are critical differences, to be sure. 
After all, it is difficult to imagine a Kiowa or 
Comanche leader offering the Rangers any-
thing but scorn and hostility, in marked con-
trast to Crowfoot's effusive praise for the 
Mounties at the signing of Treaty Number 
Seven. And yet by the mid-1880s, the bleak 
conditions of reservation life facing the Kiowa 
and Comanche strongly resembled the pov-
erty and starvation afflicting the Blackfoot and 
Cree on their reserves. Considering that in 
both instances it was largely police vigilance 
that had produced such results, the insistence 
by many Canadian historians that the North-
West Mounted Police afforded gentle treat-
ment to the Natives it controlled seems, in 
fact, to be no sure thing at all. 96 
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